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COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is at the center of the “new economy.” New
economy products are characterized by declining average costs over a range
of outputs, high rates of innovation, and network effects.1 Classically,
intellectual property is one element among many in a production process
adding to the value of a firm via licensing for competent exploitation of IP
rights, cost reductions, R&D investment, and new products.2 Cumulative
innovation proceeds as innovators build on each other’s discoveries.
A vital target of IP law is to reward innovation and creation, by granting
exclusive rights to use a new invention, information or a cultural good. The
legal system induces the economic system, and legal norms must be assessed
in ways that lead to the best outcome.3 The return from intellectual property
rights is directly correlated to the duration and scope of those rights.
Copyright offers authors a legal instrument that reimburses them for
their creative works. Copyrights are not absolute, and a copyright holder
never has complete control over all probable uses of his work. A copyright
is the right given to creators for their literary or artistic works, encompassing
mediums such as books and e-books, plays, newspapers, computer programs,
databases, films, musical compositions, paintings, photographs, sculpture,
architecture, advertisements and maps. Copyright does not embrace ideas,
processes or procedures, mathematical concepts or methods of operation.
Similarly, IP rights make digital goods legally exclusive as well. The
protection obtainable by copyright is only for the expression of the work.
* Advocate and Economist. BSc (Econ) Aristotle University, JD Democritus University, LLM, PhD
(Law) University of Hull, PhD (Econ) University of Peloponnese. The author may be contacted by email
at zekosg@uop.gr or zekosg@yahoo.com.
1. GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, MNE’S IN 21ST CENTURY (2016); GEORGIOS. I. ZEKOS, LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IPRS (2016); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
926 (2001).
2. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (2011) (“[T]he purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital
and organization so that creative work may be exploited.”)
3. R. H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 715 (1992).
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The goal of copyright law is to preclude the unlawful use or piracy of any
literary or artistic work by a third party. Works that are not protected by
copyright law therefore belong to the public.
Trademark law allows consumers, in the marketplace, to swiftly
identify a product they liked or disliked in the past. Therefore, trademarks
allow companies and consumers to distinguish among the different
competing manufacturers of a given product. No one is entitled to sell or
deliver commodities under the appearance that the commodities derive from
someone else. The importance of consumer protection cannot be overemphasized, and the average consumer standard should remain the central
point of the inquiry, even for domain name litigation. Trademark protection
promotes three main policies: (1) protection of the trademark holder’s
goodwill, (2) protection of the consumer, and (3) economic efficiency.
Goodwill should be protected to the extent needed to prevent the unjust
enrichment of a competitor. When there is no confusion at the time the user
clicks on the advertisement or web-link, it does not lead to unjust enrichment.
Fair use is a defense to trademark infringement, and one example of fair use
is comparative advertising. Trademark protection, while constituting a vital
instrument to make certain markets transparent, must be reconciled with
other principal values including free expression, by enhancing consumer
information and consumer preference, and free competition, averting
needless barriers of entry in the market.4
The TRIPS Agreement includes a set of minimum principles for IP
rights protection and calls for all member countries to use the most-favorednation principle in IP protection. Nevertheless, IP rights protection is
currently not close to harmonization across nations, and the TRIPS
Agreement failed to harmonize standards of protection among intellectual
property systems. The TRIPS Agreement does, however, include Article 10,5
which describes computer programs and compilations of data, as well as
Article 11,6 which tackles the rights of authors and their successors in title to
allow or prevent others from commercially renting their copyrighted works.
WIPO further states that copyrights exist “to encourage a dynamic creative
culture, while returning value to creators so that they can lead a dignified

4. See Georgios I. Zekos, Trademarks and Cyberspace, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 496 (2006),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1422-2213.2006.00301.x/epdf.
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 10, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
6. TRIPS Agreement art. 11.
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economic existence, and to provide widespread, affordable access to content
for the public.”7 Therefore, the environment of intellectual property has
rapidly altered over the past two decades. With the advent of cyberspace,
people have transformed the way they share information and consume
intellectual property. As a result, it has become easier than ever for people
around the globe to misappropriate protected material.
The goal of this Article is to illustrate the developments in copyright
and trademark law due to globalization and cyberspace. These developments
will be illustrated by using theory and practice to point toward a tentative
relationship between IP rights protection and the distribution of foreign
direct investment (“FDI”) across jurisdictions. Moreover, this Article
investigates and provides an answer regarding the ultimate impact of
copyrights and trademarks on FDI inflows by employing the zekcopy6 and
zekmark6 indices.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Background of Copyright
Copyright applies to any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.8 It protects the mode in which an author articulates
an idea or a set of facts, but not the idea or facts themselves.9 Furthermore,
copyright applies to an original work of authorship, fixed in a tangible
medium embodiment embracing body language, facial expression, and
reactions to other actors and elements of a scene.
Only the creative expression in a work is protected by copyright;
copyright does not protect functional matter.10 While software can obtain
copyright protection as a literary work,11 courts tend to give it a thin level of
protection.12 For example, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that the application programming interfaces of the Java
programming language were copyrightable expression, as opposed to noncopyrightable functional matter.13

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Copyright and Related Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2015).
2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:31 (Mar. 2016).
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2015).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
750 F.3d at 1368, 1381.
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Regarding the rebroadcasting of television programs, the Supreme
Court held that doing so infringes the public performance right, even when
technology is used that effectively gives each viewer a personal antenna.14
This is because Congress added the definition of “public performance,”
called the Transmit Clause, to the copyright statute to cover not only an
initial showing, but also the rebroadcasting of any copyrighted content.15
Notably, in Cartoon Network LP, v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the court held that
there was no public performance of the work where customers of
Cablevision used remote storage offered by Cablevision to record programs
and watch them at their leisure, because the recording system “would not
directly infringe [the copyright owners’] exclusive rights to reproduce and
publicly perform their copyrighted works.”16
Copyright applies to written works, and a wide series of creative works,
including sculptures, photographs, maps, and computer software. Anyone
who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, enjoys a separate,
personal copyright.17 Copyright also allows for compilation works, which
protect the order and way of presenting the compilation’s elements.
However, compilation works do not extend to the elements themselves.18
Copyright protection also does not extend to systems, procedures, and
methods of operation. Systems and procedures are not only analogous to
underlying ideas and formulas, but are also within the purview of patent law.
Granting copyrights to systems, procedures and methods of operations could
develop a backdoor method for obtaining copyrights for ideas incapable of
receiving protection through the more rigorous patent law. With this in mind,
an author’s description of the procedure may be copyrighted, but not the
procedure itself.19
Under modern copyright law, an author is not required to take any
affirmative steps for copyright to accrue; copyright attaches from the

14. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
15. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506.
16. 536 F. 3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008).
17. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). Copyright also protects a compilation work, which is defined as “a
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures
authors the right to their original expression . . . .”).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015) (noting that copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated or embodied”); Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 468
(2d Cir. 2002); SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2005).
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moment of fixation in a tangible medium. Consequently, everything that has
been written down, from a novel to an email and everything in between,
allows the author to have a copyright, presuming that the writing is an
original work exhibiting a minimal degree of creativity.
Copyright also allows free communication of facts, while still
protecting an author’s expression. This means that every idea, theory and
fact in a copyrighted work becomes immediately offered for public
exploitation at the moment of publication.20
However, copyright can also hamper creators. While the grant of
exclusive rights incentivizes some to create new information, it restricts
others’ capacity to employ that information as raw material for a new
expression following up on the previous material. Proprietary information
is also burdensome to lawfully appropriate, since copyright owners can
charge any licensing fee they desire, or even decline to license their work
altogether.21 Protection for intellectual property is provided in the interests
of encouraging innovation and creativity. The U.S. intellectual property
system is focused on creating optimal incentives that will promote
innovation and creativity.22 Ownership of the right grants the author, or the
author’s exclusive licensee, an exclusive right to exploit the work through its
reproduction, distribute copies of the work, publicly perform the work and
create derivative works. In addition to the above rights, which are of an
economic nature, a copyright also confers moral rights, which are not of
20. Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The
general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions
and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 1476, at 56, (Sept. 3, 1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not
preclude others from using ideas or information revealed by the author’s work.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
21. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that the “ultimate
aim” of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”); Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity,
thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity.”); Julie E.
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is
universally agreed to be a good that copyright law should seek to promote . . . .”); Ned Snow, The
Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (2013) (“[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright
that defines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on creativity).”).
22. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he incentive to profit from the exploitation
of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The
profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”).
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practical relevance for the purposes of economic analysis in the United
States. Although the mere existence of copyright does not necessarily per se
confer significant market power to owners or their licensees, the success of
a given item on the market and the exclusive exploitation of the right imply
market power.
The idea of creative freedom is apparent itself in intellectual property
laws. Copyright, despite extension after extension, has a termination date
codified within the Constitution of the United States in order to secure
exclusive rights to authors for a limited time.23 Thus, copyright is not
unlimited. Over the years, it has been extended to cover the length of the
creator’s life and an additional fifty or seventy years, depending on the date
of the author’s death, for signatories of the WIPO treaties relating to
copyrights.
Copyright protection for original and derivative works encourages
creativity by increasing the odds of appropriating the benefits of the
creations. The rationale underlying copyright is that without exclusive rights,
copyrighted goods would not be produced in adequate quantity and quality,
therefore leaving society in worse condition. To be eligible for copyright
protection, a work must be original. However, comparatively simple works
are entitled to copyright protection so long as the required quantum of
originality is present.24 In order for a work to be copyrighted, a work only
has to have a minimal level of originality.
Occasionally, an idea can become so entangled with its expression that
the two become inseparable. As a result, that specific work should not be
protectable, because the work falls within the merger doctrine.25 If there is
only one or a very limited number of ways to express an idea, the expression
of that idea is not copyrightable, because granting copyright to the expression
would grant an impermissible right over the idea itself.26As a result, the work
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2015).
24. Katherine L. McDaniel & James Juo, A Quantum of Originality in Copyright, 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP.169 (2009); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
parts numbers were not copyrightable, because they are both not original and analogous to short phrases
or titles); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
publisher’s factual enhancements to judicial opinions were not sufficiently creative and original to
warrant copyright).
25. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 463, 481 (Mar. 2010).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will
not be barred, since protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the
‘idea’ upon the copyright owner.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (an expression will be found to be merged into the idea when “there are no or few
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is not capable of attaining copyright protection. The merger doctrine echoes
the rule that where the expression is vital to the statement of the idea, or
where there is only one mode or very few means of expressing the idea, the
idea and the expression “merge” into an un-protectable totality.27
Consequently, when an idea and its expression are inseparable, copyright
law finds the two have “merged” into a single expression, which is not
copyrightable. The distinction between idea and expression is more difficult
to make in case where an image expresses an idea in ways that words
cannot.28 Whether a specific visual image is protectable under the merger
doctrine is not easily decided.29 For example, a jewelry company could not
enjoin the manufacture of all jewel-encrusted pins shaped like bees.30 When
these lines are blurred, as they often are in copyright litigation, courts will
often favor economic considerations over concerns of freedom of
expression.31 The merger doctrine mostly applies to architectural works and
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, such as building codes and
accountancy forms.32
Copyright protection can supplant other rights, such as patent rights,
where the ideas are not protectable but the expression is pure computer and
mathematical algorithms. However, business-method software is one of the
fastest-growing categories of new patents, and software patents represent
fifteen percent of all patents.33 The First Circuit held in Lotus v. Borland
Lotus that the menu command structure for a spreadsheet was an

other ways of expressing a particular idea.”); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he test is whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully
appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material of substance and value.”).
27. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967); Woods v. Resnick,
725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 821 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
28. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth
a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (Jan. 2012).
29. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“When the idea and its
expression are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression
in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”).
31. Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s Merger and Scenes a
Faire Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (Winter 2007).
32. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
33. J. Bessen & R.M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
16, 157–89 (2007).
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uncopyrightable “method of operation” but this holding was rejected by
Oracle.34
The lack of inventiveness in newly granted business method patents
begs the question as to the degree of inventiveness in other fields of
technology. It is worth mentioning here that Bilski v. Kappos shows judicial
disagreement over whether business methods are patent-eligible subject
matter, evidencing patent law’s struggle to address some technological
advances.35 Relatedly, copyright law is expected to remain unsettled as new
issues arise and technology continues to progress.
B. Copyright and Freedom of Expression
Is free speech being depleted by intellectual property, putting both
individual liberty and the public good at risk? The Constitution clearly
confers Congress the right to limit speech by forbidding others to make use
of copyrighted material.36 To that extent, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the likelihood of a First Amendment defense to copyright
infringement claims.37 These traditional contours comprising the First
Amendment are the two key exceptions to copyright infringement: fair use
and the definitional balance.38 Fair use defenses to copyright infringement

34. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by equally divided
court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 1610, ENCYCLOPEDIA L.
& ECON. 197 (2000) (noting that, “if switching costs are high enough, giving copyright protection to a
popular user interface that has become an industry standard can extend the copyright owner’s monopoly
into the computer, not just the interface market”); see William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network
Externalities in 760, ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 970 (2000) (arguing that limiting copyright protection
for network externalities in the case of computer software could bleed over into other areas of copyright,
such as fan fiction, and that weakening copyright protection allows greater competition by clones but
reduces the payoff for innovators); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
35. 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Laura N. Gasaway. Copyright Basics: From Earliest Times to the Digital
Age, WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 241 (2009–10).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
817, 837–38 (2013) (describing how a failed constitutional challenge to Congress’s extension of the
copyright term “became a symbol representing the darker side of the expansion of intellectual property
laws”).
37. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright law
have not been disturbed, and therefore the built-in free speech protections available in the Copyright Act
are enough to accommodate the First Amendment); Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation Enterprises,
Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2015); accord Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991);
Janice E. Oaks, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV.
135, 137 (1984).
38. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair
use for consumers to use video cassette recorders to time-shift television programs); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 539 (1985) (holding that it was not fair use for a magazine, The Nation, to
quote several hundred key words from the unpublished autobiography of former President Gerald Ford);

10 ZEKOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE

4/22/16 1:28 PM

321

claims permit defendants to argue that their infringing use of another’s
copyrighted work was done for a non-commercial or educational purpose. In
addition, courts use the fair use doctrine to ascertain, on a case-by-case basis,
whether an accused infringer should be liable for damages. The definitional
balance exception precludes copyrighting ideas and facts.39 Like the
definitional balance between an idea and its expression, fair use plays a large
role in protecting First Amendment interests against private copyright
monopolies, if somewhat unsuccessfully.40 The definitional balance and fair
use analyses are adequate protection for any work that had gained or regained copyright protection from the new legislation.41
The First Amendment protects non-verbal expression, as well as ideas.
The Supreme Court has upheld ideas and non-verbal expression as
constitutionally protected free speech. Examples of these forms of protected
speech include certain musical lyrics, flag burning, or non-obscene
pornography.42 When the line between idea and expression is unclear, the
copyright infringement becomes more difficult.43
There is no per se ban on First Amendment challenges to copyright
infringement claims, but there has yet to be a case in which First Amendment
arguments prevailed. Additionally, no act of Congress has, to date, been held
to unconstitutionally alter the traditional contours of copyright.44 ACTA
requires member states to impose both fines and imprisonment for not only
copying a work, but also “aiding and abetting” a “criminal” infringer.45

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that it could be fair use for the music
group 2 Live Crew to make a rap parody version of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman, and that “[f]air
use remained exclusively [a] judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.”); Stewart
v. Abend 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (finding no fair use for the producers of Alfred Hitchcock’s film Rear
Window to carry on showing the film after their rights were terminated in the underlying story.
39. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107–15 (2010).
40. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that parody is a fair use defense but
satire is not); Visual Resources Association, STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR TEACHING,
RESEARCH,
AND
STUDY
(2011),
http://www.vraweb.org/organization/pdf/VRAFairUseGuidelinesFinal.pdf.
41. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874(restoring copyright status to foreign works formerly in the public
domain in the United States, upholding the international copyright treaty and moving public domain
works back into protected status, thus leading to more restrictive IP provisions).
42. Amanda Beshears Cook, Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Saving Free Speech from
Advancing Legislation, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 790 (1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
43. Johnson, 491 U.S. 418; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1990).
44. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
45. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
TRADE
AGREEMENT
arts.
23–24,
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/acta1105_en.pdf; Kenneth L. Port, A Case Against the ACTA, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1131, 1165 (Feb. 2012) (arguing that ACTA provisions “are both vague and
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Criminalizing acts that were historically civil infringement concerns free
speech proponents.46 The DMCA did not violate the First Amendment rights
of those who posted decoding programs that would permit other cyberspace
users to decrypt and manipulate encrypted content.47 It is questionable that
the DMCA even serves the goal of protecting intellectual property revenue.48
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), an international treaty that
sought to harmonize international copyright laws, restored the copyright
protection of many foreign works that had already entered the public
domain.49
Is there a difference between intellectual property laws in common law
and civil law countries? Gradually, the outgoing protection of private
property rights has come at the expense of free expression, through modern
interpretation of copyright doctrine and recent legislative implementation of
particular international agreements. Civil law countries view intellectual
property rights as natural rights, and even grant moral rights to copyright
holders. By contrast, common law countries, such as the United States, view
intellectual property rights as the only channel to carry out the natural right
of free expression, and sequentially, the public good. The disregard of
inherent conflict erodes the right of public dissemination of information in
favor of private property rights creating private monopolies over information
and unconstitutionally “chills” expression aggravating the democratic,
public benefit rationale of the original constitutional clauses.50
Is there a shared purpose of copyright and the First Amendment?51 Civil
law countries view copyright as a “natural” right of authorship, while
common law countries view copyright as a way to incentivize works of
authorship, and advance the dissemination of information. In common law

frightening to a free society”); Khaliunaa Garamgaibaatar, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
Copyrights, Intermediaries, and Digital Pirates, 20 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 199, 201 (2011).
46. Jennifer L. Hanley, ISP Liability and Safe Harbor Provisions: Implications of Evolving
International Law for the Approach Set Out in Viacom v. YouTube, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 183, 199 (2012).
47. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
48. Daniel J. Gervais, Cloud Control: Copyright, Global Memes, and Privacy, 10 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 53 (Winter 2012)
49. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 755 (2013)
(noting that the free software movement is based on the theory that “freedom of use fosters increased
collaboration, which in turn spurs inventive and creative activity”).
50. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright law: Forgetting the Past and
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 425 (2004).
51. Joshua N. Mitchell, Promoting Progress with Fair Use, 60 DUKE L.J. 1639, 1642–56 (Apr.
2011).
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counties, free speech and public dissemination of ideas are “natural rights”
that are more vital than the legislatively granted intellectual property rights.52
Permitting authors to benefit from their works for a limited period of
time persuades authors to disseminate their ideas. In this way, the United
States Constitution grants Congress the power to ascertain intellectual
property rights that do not already exist in a natural state and serve the public
good, which is one of the shared goals of the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.53 The dissemination of information eventually serves the
public, as opposed to individual information and the ideas’ own economic
gain.54 Thus, overprotecting First Amendment rights against copyright law
leads to the production of less speech of “public interest.”55
C. Restrictions to the Rights of Copyright Owners
Should the unauthorized use of a work be protected by the First
Amendment?56 Fair dealing and fair use provisions shield personal use
copying for purposes of research, study, criticism, and review.57 There are
very few private or personal fair use decisions in the U.S., due to high
difficulties in revealing such uses and the expense of litigation relative to the
expected recovery. 58
The U.S. Code codifies four different fair use factors to use when
determining whether an author has infringed upon another’s copyright, or
whether the use is allowable, and accommodates the First Amendment by
permitting use of another creator’s work through quotations, educational
purposes, parody, and non-commercial use.59 The “public good” or “public

52. David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the
Image of the First Amendment, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 86–87 (2011).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
54. 5-19E MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03 (2011).
55. Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact
on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18 (1998); United Video v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173,
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
56. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
57. Copyright Law of Japan, Law No. 43, art. 30–31 (June 27, 2012) (Japan) (discussing personal
use and private study); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 §§ 29–30, c. 48 (Eng.); Copyright Act
1968 (Cth) 40–41 (Austl.).
58. Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); Recording Indus. Ass’n of
Am. v. Diamond Multimedia, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding consumer space-shifting
of music to constitute fair use).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) The four fair use factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
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benefit” plays a role in determining the rationale and nature of use under the
first § 107 factor.60 Fair use plays a substantial part in balancing the interests
of rights holders, users, and the public concerning many activities that the
U.S. Congress has not produced explicit R&Is to address.61 Moreover, fair
use initially evolved as a constraint on the scope of U.S. copyright law to
balance competing interests in cases in which second comers made
productive uses of a first author’s work in producing a new one, not to
balance interests in new technology cases.62 It is worth mentioning that ad
hoc decisions are made for each case on what is or is not exactly fair use.63
Fair use causes respect for copyright law. Codes of fair use best
practices permit user communities to come to a consensus about practices
that make possible reasonable uses that do not cause appreciable harm to
authorial markets.64 It is argued that the fair use doctrine inadequately
protects huge numbers of creators because permitting even a near-exact copy
inhibits artists from creating new works and publishing those works for
public view.65
The idea/expression (or fact/expression) dichotomy is codified in §
102(b), advancing the dissemination of ideas and permitting an idea or
factual information to flow freely from one author to another, and from

copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Id.
60. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
61. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137
(1990).
62. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the practice
unfair partly because Texaco was a commercial entity and the copies furthered its commercial interests);
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1362–63 (finding photocopying within the Classroom Guidelines to be
unquestionably fair); 17 U.S.C. § 108(d) (permitting photocopying of single article for library patrons);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (photocopying
of copyrighted materials for educational course packs held unfair because licenses opportunities were
available); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (reaffirming the
fair use safe harbor but holding that it does not shield those who induce infringement).
63. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2014); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (finding
that not all commercial appropriation could be considered infringement, and that the test is how
“transformative” the parody is of the original work, as well as how much market value the parody directly
takes from the original).
64. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK
IN COPYRIGHT (2011) (discussing the value of best practices).
65. Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context
of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 371, 376 (2010) (arguing that codes of
best practices often contain “more wishful thinking than reality” and promise more certainty than existing
case law warrants).
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authors to consumers of works.66 By preserving ideas and facts for the public
domain, copyright law evades conflict with the First Amendment serving the
public good. Copyright law serves public ends by supplying individuals with
an enticement to engage in private ones.67
Modern copyright laws grant authors rights to control exploitations of
their works.68 There is a set of restrictions and impediments (“R&Is”)
embraced by legislatures or developed through common law adjudication.
R&Is make possible free uses of protected works under national copyright
laws, although some R&Is are subject to equitable remuneration
obligations.69 The following are the various rationales of R&Is:
The rationales of R&Is are grounded in normative values and views on
copyright, while others are more pragmatic reactions to the complex
difficulties intrinsic in the lawmaking process and the prerequisite to balance
competing interests.
R&Is promote ongoing authorship such as the fair use doctrine.70
Indeed, one of the most significant functions of fair use in U.S. law is to
sponsor ongoing authorship. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court, speaking on fair use, stated that “permit[ting] . . . courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute . . . would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”71 Productive uses are fair
when they are neutral or positive about the works on which they draw.72
R&Is create a buffer for user autonomy and personal property.
Balancing the interests of the public with those of authors is a purpose of the
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”).
67. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
69. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (2014); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-But-Paid, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1383 (recommending permitted-but-paid L&Es for many “redistributive” uses that
American courts have ruled are fair, and pointing to foreign L&Es that permit uses subject to
remuneration). Some European scholars have proposed a model copyright law for the EU under which
some L&Es would be subject to remuneration. See The Wittem Project: European Copyright Code, art. 5
(April 2010), www.copyrightcode.eu.
70. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); New Era Publ’ns Int’l
v. Carol Publ’g Grp.,904 F.2d 152 (2d. Cir. 1990).
71. 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)); Pierre L.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
72. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Hofheinz v. A
& E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.
2013); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that the
distribution of a recording of a company’s conference call with analysts that disclosed the company’s
earning was fair use).
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international copyright system.73 Some R&Is intend to provide public
benefits fostering the Public Interest in Access to Information. Both authorial
and broader public interests rationalize R&Is that advance access to works
and information. The fair use doctrine is the principal way U.S. law fulfills
this function.74 The exclusion of U.S. government works from copyright
protections elevates public access to information.75 Data-mining which
entails digitizing works and indexing their contents so that the texts can be
analyzed by specialized software programs is considered to be fair use
defenses.76 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust held that fair use protected
unauthorized scanning and compiling of books into a searchable database
involving only a limited set of rationale, so is only preliminary to applying
fair use to Google Books as a whole. 77 In Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton
the court also placed more weight on the market influence of the potential
loss of licensing revenue reversing a safe harbor approach to the application
of fair use to university course books.78
R&Is carry out social and cultural policy goals making possible the use
of in-copyright materials in the course of face-to-face teaching in nonprofit
educational institutions, facilitating libraries and archives to reproduce
works to preserve them, and allowing the formation of special format works
so print-disabled persons have greater access to literary works.79 For
instance, in the HathiTrust case, the court upheld creation of a full-text
73. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932), cited approvingly in Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005); 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3)–106(5) (2002); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal
Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2005) (exempting photographs or pictures of protected works for purposes
of comment or news reporting); 17 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2005) (allowing libraries and archives to make and
lend copies of broadcast news programs).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL
2951281 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008).
76. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding a nonprofit digital library
made fair use of books from research library collections in developing a full-text searchable database that
made it possible for researchers to run search queries for books on certain topics of interest); A.V. v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding it fair use to make copies of student papers so
that a computer program could detect plagiarism); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2003); White v. West Pub. Corp., No. 12 Civ. 1340(JSR), 2013 WL 544057 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Matthew
Sag, Copyright and Copy Reliant Technology, 103 N.W. L. REV. 1607 (2009).
77. Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 87.
78. 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair Use Cases of 2014 (Guest Blog Post),
TECHNOLOGY
&
MARKETING
LAW
BLOG
(Jan.
5,
2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guest-blog-post.htm.
79. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, arts. 5(2)(c), 5(3)(b), [2001]
O.J. (L 167/16–17) [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive].
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searchable database containing copyrighted books for reason of preserving
the books and of making them more available to print-disabled persons, both
of which went beyond the contours of the statutory exceptions.80
R&Is permit public institutions to operate by making and distributing
copies, and perhaps even to perform, copyrighted works for nonconsumptive governmental purposes.81 Many countries have special
exemptions from liability for utilization of in-copyright materials in
investigations, adjudications, administrative proceedings and the like.82
R&Is carry out economic purposes promoting commerce, competition,
and continuing innovation which means curing or alleviating market failure
problems, sometimes through compulsory or statutory licenses and
sometimes through obvious discharge. Fair use has permitted the reverse
engineering of software in the U.S.83 For instance, Nintendo, which sold a
video game system and video games, sued Galoob, a company that sold a
product called Game Genie that modified Nintendo’s games, for copyright
infringement; Nintendo alleged that modifying a game with the Game Genie
created a derivative work, violating Nintendo's copyright in their video
games.84 Another competition-fostering fair use involved the use of
copyrighted images in advertising.85
R&Is exempt economically unimportant supplementary uses. The
European InfoSoc Directive identifies that incidental copies made of digital
works not have independent economic significance consenting that these
incidental copies be exempted from copyright liability. It is worth
mentioning that there is no equivalent provision in U.S. law.86
R&Is are embraced for politically useful reasons such as interpreting
legal protections as extending to public performance rights.87 Some R&Is
80. Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 87.
81. Shell v. City of Radford, 351 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Va. 2005); Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. Copyright Act, Law No. 43 of June 27, 2012, art. 42 (Japan).
83. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Directive 2009/24/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 6,
[2009] O.J. (L 111/19).
84. Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. Sony Entm’t Am. Inc. v. Bleem LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2002); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
86. Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding incidental
capture of music in news coverage of parade was fair use); 117 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1998) (permitting owners
of copies of computer programs to make backup copies); InfoSoc Directive, art. 5(1), [2001] O.J. (L
167/16).
87. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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present flexibility in copyright laws such as in the occasion copyright owners
would voluntarily license parodies of their works for the reason that they
may be indisposed to subject their works to the kind of critical commentary
that parodies are expected to bring about.88
D. Copyright in the Digital Era
Advances in digital technology, the commercialization of the Internet,
and the invention of entire new fields of human activity, such as e-commerce,
nanotechnology, biotechnology and nanobiotechnology, have driven
alterations in the core of copyright.89 Copyright vests in an inventor, the
moment he “fixes” the work to a tangible medium of expression.90
Cyberspace reduces creators’ opportunity for profit as illegal activities and
free content undercut the legitimate market.91
Copyright, by contrast to patent law, has for the most part ignored
technology and in doing so it has purchased some useful adaptability to
technological change. New technologies regularly disrupt international
copyright law, requiring that legislatures adjust laws to align with the market.
International norms shift and develop over time. The internet has tested
copyright markets and copyright law because the internet has a dark side
embodied in its broadly realized capability for unlicensed, but always
88. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
89. Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How User-Generated Content
Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. ENT & TECH. L. 841, 852–54 (2008) (explaining that technology
advances have decreased cost of producing and distributing expressive works, resulting in more
blockhead authors); JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 14 (2011)
(describing today’s copyright laws as “a legal regime that threatens to make criminal infringers of us
all”); id. at 129 (“[T]he widening ambit of copyright protection has increasingly encroached upon critical
First Amendment values, suppressing transformative uses of copyrighted works that advance creativity
and free speech rights.”); PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANSATLANTIC BATTLE (2014) (opposing the author-oriented Continental copyright tradition against the
public minded Anglo-American copyright tradition and contending that undue attention to authors
restricts access to culture and suppresses expression).
90. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that Kirby’s
comic book characters were works made for hire, and therefore Kirby had no right to terminate transfer
of copyright to Marvel); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1064–79 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(finding that certain “Superman” works were works made for hire, and therefore not within scope of
termination right); Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV.
613 (2014) (stating that Congress does not have power to enact copyright laws for the benefit of
disseminators if they do not also benefit authors).
91. ROB LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS,
AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 252–53 (2011); Robert McCrum, From Bestseller
to Bust: Is This the End of an Author’s Life?, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/02/bestseller-novel-to-bust-author-life (citing the rise of
free content on the internet as a challenge for authors today and finding that writing is increasingly
unprofitable for unknown authors).
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perfect, copies and streams of copyrighted works. Moreover, the internet
makes prospective copyright infringers of us all. Copyright law should
promote copyright commerce requiring not just readily divisible and
transferable rights, but also information about those rights. The abundance
and ready substitutability of copyright goods systematically press toward
competitive prices.
The copyright law has every time failed to safeguard the rights of artists
and authors on cyberspace. In addition, public opinion is hostile toward
improved copyright protections. Copyright law will remain unsettled as new
issues arise and technology continues to develop.92 Digitization and the
internet permitted immediate perfect replication and so IPRs had to grow. In
2005, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Copyright Act to embrace a
form of liability it had never before acknowledged in the context of
copyright, providing technology that stimulates copyright infringement.93
Moreover, copyright law present, under the judicially-developed merger
doctrine, that property rights under copyright law are denied when an unprotectable idea cannot be separated from protectable illustration of the
idea.94
The technology that brings works directly to users’ computers and
personal portable devices no longer necessitates conventional publishing’s
infrastructure of intermediaries. In any case, every computer-equipped
author makes his work directly available to his audience via cyberspace.
Although availing the resources of distribution is one thing, making a living
from the works one distributes is another.95
Copyright is about maintaining control—both economic and artistic—
over the fate of the work.96 Attribution and integrity clauses have

92. Laura N. Gasaway, Copyright Basics: From Earliest Times to the Digital Age, WAKE FOREST
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 241 (2009–10).
93. MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
94. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2007).
95. Trent Hamm, The Truth About Making Money Online, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29,
2013,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Simple-Dollar/2013/1029/The-truth-about-makingmoney-online (describing how “the only way to make money consistently online is to produce a lot of
content on a very consistent basis,” and that proceeds are often realized in the long-term, not immediately
after publication); Jim Edwards, Yes, You Can Make Six Figures as a YouTube Star . . . And Still End Up
Poor, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 10, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-youtubestarsactually-make-2014-2 (finding that even YouTube content providers that generate high gross
revenue see less than 50% of that revenue, resulting in unsustainable costs for building a business).
96. Vineet Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARVARD BUS. REV. 27 (May 2014) (“Over the
past decade ‘freemium’—a combination of ‘free’ and ‘premium’—has become the dominant business
model among internet start-ups and smartphone app developers”).
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distinguished licenses in the open source software community.97 Authors
who self-distribute on the internet face the possibility of respect for their
names and their works, but without remuneration.98 Cyberspace and social
media have stimulated revolutions both in the music industry.99
Technological advances have made it significantly easier for musicians not
only to create/ produce music, but also to distribute it. The Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA), the trade association representing
the labels, has claimed that “illegal downloading” has resulted in “fewer
musicians.”100
Modern media technologies from the VCR onwards have made reader
copying much easier, and digital media technologies often make copies as
part of the ordinary reading or playback process. Fair use has stepped in to
make certain that ordinary acts of reading remain non-infringing.101
Copyright ignores robots.102 Robotic reading is a form of automation, and as
such it has to confront familiar critiques of automation’s effects on
humans.103 It is argued that works authored through artificial intelligence
should be copyrightable.104
Copyright laws do not protect the users’ data, as the users energetically
surrender the protection when clicking to agree to terms of service.105 The

97. Rebecca Schoff Curtin, Hackers and Humanists: Transactions and the Evolution of Copyright,
54 IDEA 103, 115–16 (2014) (noting that free software “values a software author’s moral rights over the
kinds of exclusive rights conveyed by U.S. copyright law” and describing incorporation of rights of
integrity and attribution into free software licenses).
98. Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, UTAH L. REV. 563, 672,
tbl.2 (2004) (comparing the inclusion of rights of integrity and attribution in a few open source licenses
and discussing the enforcement of the right of integrity under an open source license).
99. Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012).
100. Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA (2015),
https://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_online.
101. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. DISH Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
102. James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657 (2016).
103. Denison v. Larkin, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (N.D Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding fair use to copy blog
post for use in an attorney discipline proceeding); White v. West Pub’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding transformative fair use for West and Lexis to make comprehensive databases
of filed legal briefs); Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding transformative
fair use to forward email, because “[b]y forwarding the post in e-mails, they conveyed the fact of the post
rather than its underlying message”).
104. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 5 (2012); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 537 (2009) (“[C]reativity is a positive virtue, not just because of its results
but because of how the process of making meaning contributes to human flourishing.”).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Ed Bayley, The Clicks that Bind: Ways Users “Agree” to Online
Terms of Service, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Nov. 16, 2009, https://www.eff.org/wp/clicksbind-ways-usersagree-online-terms-service.
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doctrine of unconscionability does not protect users from application owners
wielding their superior power to take away individuals’ rights.106 The
convergence of technology and new art methods in the form of applications
has shown that current copyright law is not equipped to provide adequate
protection.107
Creators of sound recordings are granted separate exclusive rights that
can similarly be transferred or licensed to record labels to administer, in
exchange for capital investment, marketing, promotion and distribution.108 In
the United States, two types of objects attract copyright in a piece of recorded
music: musical works and sound recordings. The musical work copyright is
granted to the composers of the music and lyrics, and the sound recording
copyright is granted to the creators of the sound recording.109 Since streaming
comprises a public performance right, a performance license needs to be
obtained from property rights offices.110 Copyright arguably has become the
law of missed opportunities.111
E. The Online Piracy Problem
The level of online piracy of copyrighted works today is unanticipated.
With the growth of streaming services, direct download sites, and peer-topeer services such as BitTorrent, the old problem of online piracy has

106. Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for
a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 795 (2004); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a user accepted the terms by using the
product after clicking through the license agreement on the screen and is, therefore, bound by them).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Lauren Russell, Mobile Phones Give Artists New Tools to Create,
CNN, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/19/living/iphone-art/index.html?iid=article_sidebar;
MONICA HORTEN, THE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENIGMA: INTERNET POLITICS AND THE ‘TELECOMS
PACKAGE’, 16–19 (2012).
108. Alex Solo, The Role of Copyright in an Age of Online Music Distribution, 19 MEDIA AND ARTS
L. REV. 169, 179 (2014); Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and
Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (2013); Peter Jenner, Copyright in the Digital
Age; Benefiting Users and Creators?, 8 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 55, 60 (2011); Seth
Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of Online Music Distribution: Innovation in
the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1898 (2011).
109. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 640–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brian
Day, In Defense of Copyright: Creativity, Record Labels, and the Future of Music, 21 SEATON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 71 (2010).
110. Richard Hooper & Ros Lynch, Streamlining Copyright Licensing for the Digital Age,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 9 (July 2012), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/dce-report-phase2.pdf.
111. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright and Musical
Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1840 (2011) (arguing that today’s copyright would have
“inhibited creativity by composers such as Bach and Mozart,” who “borrowed extensively in their
works”).
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extended and spread in new and often arbitrary manners.112 Peer-to-peer
systems have become bastions of Internet piracy. Nearly 98.8% of files on
the LimeWire peer-to-peer system were copyrighted and likely distributed
without authorization.113 Moreover, around 95% of downloads through the
Torrentbox and Isohunt sites infringed copyrights.114 This piracy problem is
not attributable to just a few die-hard infringers, however. The International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry found that 28% of Internet users
access unauthorized content services each month.115 Today’s pirates grew up
in a globe with limited enforcement of copyright online. The public backlash
against SOPA and PIPA has made the U.S. Congress to follow any new
online copyright enforcement legislation.116 Copyright holders are left with
the existing copyright law, which has proven unproductive and mismatched
to stopping piracy in the cyberspace age.117 The DMCA, approved by
Congress in 1998, is the endeavor of the United States Congress to limit
Internet piracy of intellectual property. The DMCA implemented a new, selfhelp procedure for copyright owners to exercise control over their
intellectual property creating problems when copyright holders who, for
political rationale or reason of corporate espionage, want to reduce the
speech of others abuse it.118 Are technological protection measures such as
DRM (digital rights management) effective? Various methods of DRM have
been largely ineffectual.119

112. Robert Layton & Paul Watters, Investigation into the Extent of Infringing Content on BitTorrent
Networks,
INTERNET
COM.
SEC.
LAB.,
at
*18
(Apr.
2010),
http://www.afact.org.au/assets/research/bt_report_final.pdf (excluding pornographic works from
conclusions due to uncertainty over infringing status).
113. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
114. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *4,
*17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
115. Digital Music Report 2012, INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS. 9, 16 (2012),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf.
116. Jack Schecter, Online Piracy Legislation: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 59 APR. FED.
LAW 20 (April 2012).
117. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong.
(2011); see generally Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, SOPA Blackout Aims to Block Internet Censorship Bill,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/sopa-blackout-internetcensorship_n_1211905.html.
118. Thomas A. Mitchell, Copyright, Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2117 (Oct. 2004).
119. Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Piracy with Novel Digital Rights
Management Technology, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 50, 61 (2012) (“A
technologically-impervious DRM is unlikely to emerge.”); Jie Hua, Toward A More Balanced Model:
The Revision of Anti-Circumvention Rules, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 327, 328–30 (2013)
(describing DRM as a preventative measure against piracy and noting criticism of the DMCA’s
overprotection of DRM technologies).
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Anti-piracy interventions are not guaranteed to be effective. Seizing the
dominant unlicensed website may have significant costs on the structure of
the piracy market, because it could both incentivize entry of new platforms,
and engender more competition among existing websites to get a piece of the
un-served market.120
Taking down infringing websites is a means to diminish consumption
of pirated media content and boost licensed consumption. The media
industry has been significantly influenced by digitization, with information
and communication technologies altering the way music, movies, and books
are consumed and produced. Luis Aguiar, Jörg Claussen and Christian
Peukert argue “concentration of demand decreases after the shutdown, with
users basing their unlicensed movie consumption on a larger set of websites
rather than on a single platform.”121
F. Direct Liability and Secondary Liability
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) offers a broad
definition of online service providers and covers different categories of
online intermediaries. These online intermediaries include Internet Service
Providers (ISP), search engines and hosting facilities.122 The ability to restrict
the liability of online intermediaries was one of the most vital policy
decisions that formed the design of the cyberspace and the freedom of
users.123
Online intermediaries have now taken various shapes and forms, thus
confronting some of the assumptions underlying early liability policies.
Copyright holders aimed to transfer some of the burden and costs of
monitoring, detecting, and enforcing rights to online intermediaries.124
The Copyright Act contemplates enforcement through lawsuits against
individual direct infringers.125 It is nearly impracticable to hold individual
120. B. Danaher, M. Smith, & R. Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement Mechanisms in
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 14 INNOVATION POLICY & ECON. 25 (2014).
121. LUIS AGUIAR, JÖRG CLAUSSEN & CHRISTIAN PEUKERT, ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT,
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, AND MARKET STRUCTURE 23 (European Commission Joint Res. Ctr. Tech.
Report, 2015).
122. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (1999).
123. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
124. Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112 Cong. (2011) (expanding the liability of
online intermediaries for copyright infringement and moving copyright enforcement to private hands).
125. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (2006) (defining an infringer as “[a]nyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner” and allows “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright” to “institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he
or she is the owner of it”).
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Internet users liable for copyright violations. The costs of enforcing
copyrights—by identifying infringers, gathering evidence, suing several
individual infringers, and collecting damages—are amplified to such an
extent that it rendered conventional enforcement measures economically
unproductive.
It is worth mentioning that in the early 1990s, some ISPs in the United
States were liable for copyright infringements committed by their
subscribers under a strict liability standard. The ISPs were found to be
strictly liable, because the simple hosting and transmission of infringing
materials amounted to copyright infringement. Strict liability was later
discarded by courts and replaced with secondary liability.126
“Vigilantism” is born from a malfunction of the law.127 Vigilantism only
occurs when the established order breaks down, such that people begin
seeking extrajudicial solutions. The turn to private enforcement of copyright
is the result of a long, persistent breakdown of public copyright enforcement.
The complexity of holding direct infringers accountable led copyright
holders to look at alternate liability theories. Secondary liability suits against
ISPs are slowed down by the safe harbors embodied in section 512 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).128 In order to affirm their rights
against the immeasurable anonymous cyberspace users pirating their works,
copyright owners have to convince a court of the need of ISP subpoenas and
contend with the unwillingness of ISPs to identify subscribers.129 ISPs
providing Internet access cannot be held liable for direct copyright
infringement, since merely holding a system that others employ to make
copies lacks an “aspect of volition or causation,” which is an indispensable
ingredient in establishing liability.130 ISP liability means adequate
126. Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112 Cong. (2011).
127. Rachel Storch, Copyright Vigilantism, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 453, 454 (2013).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
129. New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-306, No. 2:12-cv-1885-GEB-EFB, 2012 WL 5031651, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (“Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a ‘good cause’ test in deciding whether to
permit expedited discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference.”); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279
F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Courts in this district have applied a ‘flexible standard of
reasonableness and good cause’ in determining whether to grant a party’s expedited discovery request.”);
Patrick Collins, Inc. v Does 1-72, No. 11-58 (RMU/JMF), 2012 WL 177864, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012)
(“The Court, therefore, will order plaintiff to show cause why it should assert jurisdiction over the person
of each John Doe defendant unless it has a good faith belief that that person is domiciled in the District
of Columbia which . . . may be premised on ‘utilizing geolocation services . . . .”).
130. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2004); Viacom Int’l Inc., v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc, 165 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that eBay is eligible for the DMCA safer harbor); UGM Recording
v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that video hosting facilities such
as YouTube and Veoh are covered by the DMCA as it “meant to cover more than the mere electronic
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knowledge concerning the infringing activity was acquired. Intermediaries
are held indirectly liable for their subscribers infringing behavior under a
range of legal doctrines of secondary liability. Liability under copyright law
does not require an intentional conduct, but volitional conduct on the part of
the defendant is needed to confirm direct liability to copyright
infringement.131 Many jurisdictions have employed safe harbor regimes for
online intermediaries, which mean that intermediaries are sheltered from
liability for users’ actions.132
New technologies persistently arise to make each hard-fought
secondary liability battle outdated. Services and Internet users have caught
copyright owners in a never-ending game of cat-and-mouse in which the law
is too slow to carry on with technological advances. ISPs intended their
network to be used for piracy and energetically encouraged their users to
share infringing files.133 Moreover, ISPs benefit from cooperating with
content owners to tackle piracy concerns. Although the DMCA provides a
safe harbor to ISPs that simply serve as passive conduits for infringing
material distributed by users, more and more face the risk of falling outside
of the safe harbor as technology becomes more complicated ISPs.134
ISPs take on and implement policies that assist copyright enforcement
on its system. The DMCA safe harbor provisions renewed the necessity to
diminish liability, in particular, circumstances given the diversity of services
offered by ISPs on top of the numerous types and different size of ISPs.
Moreover, online intermediaries were cut off from copyright liability,

storage of data, to specifically encompass the access-facilitating processes offered by a video sharing
platform service”); J. de Beer & C. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A NonNeutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 404–05 (2009) (targeting enforcement
efforts at individual infringers, such as the global recording industry’s lawsuits against alleged file
sharers, have proven to be ineffective); Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that a Bulletin Board System operator was strictly liable for distributing infringing materials
which were uploaded and downloaded by his users).
131. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008); Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932–33 (2005).
132. J. Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 270 (2006) (“OSPs,
ISPs, and search engines dominated the technological landscape of 1996–97, and the DMCA and CDA
were designed to encourage these companies to act only in ways that would not drastically alter their
business models or technological architectures.”).
133. MGM Studios, Inc. 545 U.S. 913, 925–26 (2005); Bryan H. Choi, The Grokster Dead-End, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 403 (2006).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2012).
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providing they remained passive facilitators of content that others originated
and reacted upon knowledge of infringing content.135
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) determined that
there was a close relationship between monitoring/filtering duties and civil
liberties.136 An ISP was under no duty to take affirmative steps against
infringements, and so a general obligation to monitor compromises
fundamental rights: the freedom to conduct business, the right to protect of
personal data, and the freedom to receive or impart information.
ISPs have been targeted but with limited outcome.137 ISPs sought an
explicit immunity under the law but clear-cut rules regarding ISPs’ liability
in managing infringement claims present a higher level of certainty. To that
extent, online intermediaries were conceived of as offering a rather open and
neutral facilitation of access to content. Keeping intermediaries neutral was
a purpose that several cyberspace policies shared.
As cyberspace is now the key channel for many forms of human
interactions, mega platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and hosting facilities
such as Apple, Amazon, YouTube, shape exchanges and access to
information with some imperative inference for competition and consumer
welfare on top of access to knowledge and civil liberties. Currently, online
intermediaries display a new type of convergence, exercising control over
content, access, as well as end users. Moreover, as publishers, online
intermediaries control both what content becomes available by restrictions
on open source apps in Apple App Store and the format in which content
becomes available. Intermediaries are more and more able to exercise control
over the use of content and so the mounting engagement of online
intermediaries in publishing content position them in conflict with their role
as neutral facilitators: in quest of maximizing their income from proprietary
content, on the one hand, while making possible free-access to open content
and User Generated Content (UGC) on the other hand.
Free access to online content is considered as a risk to commercial
interests, as users are unwilling to pay for content that is freely available on

135. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012); Council Directive 2000/31/EC §14 (2003); M. E.
Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 203, 208
(2012).
136. SABAM v. Netlog, C-360/10 (Belg. 2012); SABAM v. Scarlet, C-70/10 (Belg. 2011); Viacom
Int’l, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting the link between profits and duties).
137. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd, 248 CLR 42, 70 (Austl. 2012); see generally Arista
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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the same platform.138 The convergence of control over access, content, and
users’ personal data opposes the neutrality of online intermediaries that was
the center for policies elaborated in the 1990s.139 As a result, access to
content in the digital ecosystem is conquered by a handful of online
intermediaries, and so the ascendancy of a small number of online
intermediaries inflates severe concerns about the competitiveness and
openness of future information markets influencing the fitting regulation of
intermediaries.
Online intermediaries have faced increasing anxiety to take on a more
positive approach to copyright enforcement. Online intermediaries have
been forced to embark on affirmative steps (ex ante) to avert or lessen
copyright infringements. Copyright holders instruct online intermediaries to
install filters or accept monitoring method to detect infringing behavior
being contradictory to the absence of a general duty to monitor.140 At the
same time, online intermediaries take on voluntarily measures such as
applying filters or implementing enforcement policies.141 In fact, online
intermediaries have involved directly as content publishers or by
strengthening their partnerships with copyright right holders.
Cyberspace service providers, website operators, content providers, and
cyberspace users cannot abide by copyright law on the global digital network
as a consequence of the large number of countries’ copyright laws that apply
to the actors’ cyberspace activities.142 The variety of potentially applicable
national copyright laws is triggered by the nature of copyright as an
intangible right produced by national laws and by the rules for choice of law
applicable to copyright infringement and other copyright-related matters.
138. J. E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE EVERYDAY
PRACTICE (Yale University Press, 2012).
139. Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on
Search Bias, HARV. J.L. & TECH., OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, at *4 (2013).
140. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005) (holding inducement doctrine
may consider failure to install preventive measures as a proof of intent, which is necessary for establishing
liability for inducement); see, e.g., Case C-70/10, Scarlet v. Sabam, 2011 E.C.R.; Case C-360/10,
SABAM v. Netlog, 2012 E.C.R. (holding that requiring an OSP to install a filtering system screening the
entire traffic in order to prevent copyright infringements would be at odds with the e-commerce Directive
prohibiting imposing a general duty to monitor on intermediary service providers).
141. Christina Angelopoulos, Filtering the Internet for Copyrighted Content in Europe,
AMSTERDAM
L.
SCH.
RES.
PAPER
N O.
2012-04
10
(2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1983866; SUSY FRANKEL & DANIEL J. GERVAIS,
THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 29 (2014)
142. Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 339, 348 (2015); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing A Private International
Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 729–33 (2009)
(reviewing the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis rule).
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Copyright enforcement on cyberspace is challenging because copyright
owners cope with infringers located in various states and with varying laws.
For instance, the law in the jurisdiction of the service provider’s domicile
might not view the content as infringing.143
G. EU Copyright
Open-ended R&Is make it possible for the law to adjust to new
circumstances, which results in the need for flexible R&Is. It could be argued
that the necessity for more openness in copyright law is clear in the present
information society of decidedly vibrant and volatile variation.144 Fair use
has taken on an imperative role in allowing copyright law to adjust to new
technological challenges not considered by the legislature.
United States law, by harmonizing individual rights with societal rights,
allows for fair use of works and fair dealings benefitting the public, without
sacrificing the creators’ rights. In most of Europe, a broad fair use exception
does not exist, but a category of uses are permitted.145 Copyright in common
law countries has utilitarian roots, while copyright in civil law countries has
natural rights roots.146
EU legislation has to be interpreted as far as possible in light of
international obligations.147 EU decision-makers have taken into account “i)
the collective and individual licensing of national copyright titles, ii) the
definition and implementation of copyright exceptions in the digital

143. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 20.01 (2d ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text
supranational choice of law rules is a delicate, if not improbable, operation.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010) (arguing that
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is not a choice of law provision but is “essentially no more than a
rule barring discrimination against foreign right holders, which requires a country to apply the same law
to works of foreign origin as it applies to works of its own nationals”).
144. Public Consultation on The Review of The EU Copyright Rules, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm; Neelie Kroes,
Reform of EU Copyright Rules: Your Chance to Give Your Views!, European Commission (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-014/kroes/en/content/reform-eu-copyright-rules-your-chancegive-your-views.
145. Tyler G. Newby, What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use
Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1648–49 (1999); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 7
(2010).
146. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63
(1995).
147. Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA, [2008] C-456/06, paras 30-31 (Ger.), ¶¶ 30–31; Titus
Alexander Jochen Donner, [2012] C-5/11, ¶¶ 22–24 (Ger.).
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environment and iii) the types of online enforcement measures that member
states have to make available to rights-holders as a result of the transposition
of EU copyright directives” so as to enhance the creation and development
of EU copyright matters.148 There is a need to preserve contractual freedom
of both content owners and commercial exploiters. EU legislative measures
cannot divest copyright holders of the prospect to target a particular public
and to make licensing fees for online exploitation fair to the actual audience
reached by content transmissions. Giuseppe Mazziotti argues “[a]ll
copyright holder representatives firmly reject the idea of any kind of
legislative reform at EU level that could lead to a more open, technologically
neutral and effectively harmonised legal framework for copyright
exceptions.”149
It has to be taken into account that the territorial nature of copyright is
not the only element that generates a prevalent national dimension of markets
for digital content in Europe. Individual creators, content licensors and
commercial exploiters take a ‘country-by-country’ approach in their relevant
businesses as a consequence of Europe’s cultural diversity, linguistic
specificities and digital divides varying per capita income from one member
country to another.
The making of the EU Digital Single Market is a policy objective rooted
in the “Digital Agenda for Europe.”150 Markets for digital content are
disintegrated and highly differentiated for grounds that are not related to the
territorially limited scope of copyright. In Europe, unauthorized access to
online content through peer-to-peer networks is broadly prevalent, but in the
U.S. legitimate services, providing online content like Netflix, engender
much more traffic than in the EU.151 Unification of EU copyright law would
have instant EU-wide effect, giving rise to a single market for copyright and
related rights through eliminating the territoriality of national copyright
rules, particularly if the system were construed as prevailing over national
titles entailing a legislative reform of EU law.152 There is a de facto
harmonization of the originality condition for subject-matter other than

148. Giuseppe Mazziotti, Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market Report of the Ceps Digital
Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies, at *9 (2013).
149. Id. at *11.
150. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe,
COM(2010) 245 (May 19, 2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
52010DC0245R(01)&from=EN.
151. Global Internet Phenomena Report, SANDVINE INTELL. BROADBAND NETWORK, 2H (2012).
152. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 118, 2012/C 326/01 (Dec. 13, 2007).
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computer programs, photographs and databases, but also paved the way to a
comprehension of EU copyright architecture as one of open-ended subjectmatter categorization.153 It is worth mentioning that diverging standards of
originality across the EU ruins the running of the internal market.154 It is
worth mentioning that that copyright protection is reserved to ‘works’ in the
Berne sense, i.e. subject-matters that are intellectual creations of their
authors.155
In Football Dataco v. Sportradar, the CJEU held that the act of re-use
is deemed to be located in the territory where user’s computer receives the
content for purposes of storage and display on screen.156 In UsedSoft, the
CJEU defined the exclusive right of distribution of the owner of a computer
program.157 To this end, the provisions of the 2001 Information Society
Directive define the exclusive rights of distribution and of making content
available to the public would need to be revised with the intention of making
the exhaustion principle applicable to permanent sales of intangible copies
of copyrighted works. It is argued that exhaustion of the right of distribution
applies to the tangible copy of a work.158 The CJEU concluded that Article
4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive has to be interpreted as meaning that the rule
of exhaustion therein does not apply in circumstances in which the
reproduction of a protected creation has undergone a substitution of its
medium, and is placed on the market again in its new form. Does the law
allow digital exhaustion? It is argued that there is no exhaustion for digital
copies of works and e-books are subject to the principle of exhaustion.159 In
153. EUR. PARL. (2009/24/EC) (2009) (addressing the legal protection of computer programs); EUR.
PARL., O.J. (L 111) (2009); EUR. PARL., O.J. (L 77) (1996) (addressing the legal protection of databases);
EUR PARL., O.J. (L 372) (2006) (codifying the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights)
; Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] I-06569; Case C-393/09
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, [2010] I-13971;
Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others
and C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] I-09083.
154. E. ROSATI, ORIGINALITY IN EU COPYRIGHT: FULL HARMONIZATION THROUGH CASE LAW
(Edward Elgar, 2013).
155. Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S, cit, [33]–[35].
156. C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v SportradarGmbH et Sportradar AG, 18 October
2012, paras. 39–43.
157. C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 3 July 2012.
158. Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright, C-419/13, EU:C:2015:27(concluding
that “exhaustion of the distribution right applies to the tangible object into which a protected work or its
copy is incorporated if it has been placed onto the market with the copyright holder’s consent”); Directive
2001/29, art. 4(2) (providing that for the InfoSoc Directive, the authorised first sale of a work within the
territory of the European Union exhausts the right of the copyright owner to control any subsequent
distribution of the work in question).
159. 22 U 60/13 (Ct. of App. of Hamm); see E Rosati, No Exhaustion Beyond Software: Katfriend
Translates German Decision on Audiobooks, THE IPKAT (July 1, 2014), http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/
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the US, it is unclear whether the law permits application of the first sale
doctrine within §109 of the U.S. Copyright Act to digital copies.160
The sale of intangible copies through cyberspace entails the exercise of
the sole right of making content available, whereas exhaustion applies only
to the right of distribution of physical copies.161 Amazon has developed a
system of ‘data stores’ where the user who no-longer desires to retain the
right to access the now used digital content is given the likelihood of
transferring it to another user’s personalized data store, while deleting the
used content from the originating data store.162
Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 (the “InfoSoc Directive”) permits
member states to set up into their own copyright laws an exception or
limitation to the rights of reproduction, communication and making available
to the public, and/or distribution, for the purpose of “caricature, parody or
pastiche” but there is no definition of these concepts.163 The CJEU held that
the person who owns the copyright to a work has a legitimate interest in
making certain that this is not related with the message communicated by its
parody if it is prejudiced. A parody evokes an on hand work while being
perceptibly different from it, and constitutes an expression of humor. The
AG then stated that the notion of parody must be considered as an
autonomous concept of EU law demanding a uniform application of EU
law.164 Additionally, one of the objectives of the InfoSoc Directive is to
harmonize specific aspects of copyright and related rights. Besides

2014/07/no-exhaustion-beyond-software-katfriend.html; District Court of KG ZA 2014, C/13/567567
14-795 SP/SV, Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet (Neth.); see M. Olmedo
Cuevas, Dutch Copyright Succumbs to Aging as Exhaustion Extends to E-Books.10 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& PRACTICE 8 (2015).
160. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Eleonora Rosati,
Online Copyright Exhaustion in a Post-Allposters World, J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACTICE (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613608.
161. Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, art. 6, [2009] O.J. (L 111/19) (codifying the content of Council Directive 91/250
EEC of 14 May 1991); InfoSoc Directive, art. 4.2 [2001] O.J. (L 167/16).
162. U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 B1(filed May 5, 2009).
163. C-201/13, Judgment in Deckmyn v Vandersteen, EU:C:2014:2132; InfoSoc Directive, art. 4.2
[2001] O.J. (L 167/16); E. Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright. Full Harmonization through Case Law
(Edward Elgar, 2013); C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, EU:C:2009:465,
¶ 27; C-467/08, Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE),
EU:C:2010:620, ¶ 32; C-510/10, DR and TV2 Danmark A/S v NCB — Nordisk Copyright Bureau,
EU:C:2012:244, ¶ 33; R. Jacob, Parody and IP claims: A Defence?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 427, 431 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds.,
2014) (arguing that “when it comes to parody ‘the genre’ has no rules, making legislation immensely
difficult. Parody ranges from the downright brutally offensive to the respectful hommage”).
164. C- 201/13, Opinion of Advocate Pedro Cruz Villalón in Deckmyn v Vandersteen,
EU:C:2014:458.
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harmonization, the other InfoSoc Directive’s objective was to align EU
copyright law and implement into the EU legal order the 1996 WIPO Internet
Treaties. Videogames are not considered merely as computer programs, but
being complex multimedia works expressing autonomous narrative and
graphic creations, such games are regarded as intellectual works protected
by copyright under the InfoSoc Directive.165 Member States have to embrace
a very similar, if not identical degree of copyright protection not including
where InfoSoc Directive leaves them some liberty, as is for example the case
of the optional list of exceptions and limitations in Article 5.166 It is argued
that the scope of copyright protection should not depend on the probable
differences in the degree of creative freedom in the production of different
categories of works, which means that the InfoSoc Directive envisages the
protection of all intellectual creations by the same reproduction right.167
Are the copyright exceptions in the EU still suitable? The Information
Society Directive did not manage to successfully harmonize copyright
exceptions beyond a specific extent, since there was no agreement between
EU legislators about the acts and uses that should have been exempted from
copyright’s scope in digital surroundings. The 2001 Directive did not make
its exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations mandatory for member states.
The concept of fair compensation, within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of
the Information Society Directive, is an autonomous concept in EU law. In
Padawan v. SGAE, the CJEU simply held that fair compensation should be
designed on the grounds of the criterion of the harm caused to authors of
protected works by the introduction of the private copying exception.168
Hardware-based levies are no longer desirable, since new models of
content distribution are developing rapidly and cloud-computing is
revolutionizing consumers’ copying habits.169 Hardware and device
manufacturers promote the accomplishment of alternative forms of fair
compensation, and assure copyright owners revenues in the long run and a
well-functioning ecosystem for creativity.

165. Case C-355/12, Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl (Jan. 23, 2014); Case C-355/12, Opinion of
Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston in Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl, (Sept. 19, 2013); InfoSoc
Directive [2001] O.J. (L 167/16).
166. Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG (Oct. 3, 2013); Case C-387/12 Hi Hotel
HCF SARL v Uwe Spoering (Apr. 3, 2014).
167. Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] I-06569; UK
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“CDPA”).
168. C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad General Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) (Oct. 21,
2010).
169. C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland Gmbh (June 16, 2011).
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The development and diffusion of broadband cyberspace access
services and cloud-based platforms have made it easy for both large-scale
copyright infringers and unauthorized users to retrieve content through cyber
lockers and other web-based platforms. This new copyright infringement has
extended its negative cost on the business of creative industries by aiming at
areas such as the film industry. Piracy had not been a considerable influence
in copyright law before the advent of broadband cyberspace and cloudcomputing. In L’Oréal v. eBay, the CJEU shed light on the intricate
interaction of online enforcement measures and of the liability exemption
that the law grants to hosting service providers.170 The online operator
benefited from the safe harbor provision insofar as it confined itself to
providing a neutral service by a simply technical and automatic processing
of the content provided by its customers. To that extent, the exemption
should not apply when the online intermediary plays an active role that
would imply knowledge of (or control over) such content.
Member states and national courts cannot impose on online
intermediaries general obligations to monitor the content they store or
transmit.171 The CJEU has held that, in granting online enforcement
measures, the protection of intellectual property should be reasonable against
the protection of fundamental rights of persons and firms that unlimited
filtering measures would without doubt influence.172
Injunctions that would compel systematic and enduring filtering
measures on online intermediaries challenge the principle of freedom of
expression and communication insofar as filtering tools cannot differentiate
between transmissions of unlawful and lawful content.173 Copyright
enforcement on cyberspace leads to restriction of lawful content
communications, particularly when the target of measures is a website where
some lawful content might be stored. Global waves of protests against SOPA
in the U.S. and ACTA in the EU have resulted. Arguments and policy aims
such as ‘Internet freedom’ and net neutrality have been used very broadly by
civil liberties organizations to appraise and discard all forms of online
content blocking for reasons of copyright enforcement. A balancing equation

170. C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay International (July 12, 2011).
171. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Legal Aspects
of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on
Electronic Commerce) [2000] O.J. (L 178/13).
172. C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefonica (Jan. 29, 2008); C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM
(Nov. 24, 2011); C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog (Feb. 16, 2012).
173. C-70/10. Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (Nov. 24, 2011); C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog (Feb. 16,
2012) (addressing, respectively, lawfulness of enforcement measures requiring lasting filtering
technologies to an ISP and the owner of a social network platform).
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between copyright enforcement and cyberspace censorship has been
projected often to portray the chilling consequences stemming from content
bans or technical restrictions to information made available online.
Is there a relation between copyright versus freedom to run a business?
The broad filtering measure requested by the Belgian collecting society
SABAM would have led to a serious restriction of the freedom of the ISP to
conduct its business which means that such a measure obligate the ISP to put
in place an intricate, costly, and permanent filtering technology at its own
expense. 174
EU law obliges member states to make personal data available for
collection for precise, explicit and legitimate reasons, and any processing
should be pertinent and balanced to the objective pursued. Copyright
enforcement is a legitimate reason validating the treatment of personal
data.175
III. TRADEMARK LAW
A. Trademarks Legal Background
Trademarks have been used to designate the source or origin of products
for years. A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof” used by a company to identify itself as the source of
particular goods and distinguish its goods from those manufactured or sold
by competitors.176
A trademark can be identified as a nexus between a specific mark and
a producer. A manufacturer must not defraud or mislead the consumer, who,
as the end-user of the product in circulation, will eventually be called upon
to interpret and assess this nexus. No one is entitled to sell or deliver
commodities under the appearance that the commodities derive from
someone else.177 It is essential to avoid misleading consumers and facilitates
174. C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (Nov. 24, 2011).
175. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art.
6 [1995] O.J. (L 281/31); C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de
España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008).
176. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000)
(quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. 514 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1995);
Dastar Corp. v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (2003); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
177. Millington v Fox (1838), 3 My. & C. 338 (U.K.); Perry v Truefitt (1842), 6 Beav. 66, 49 Eng.
Rep. 749 (“A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods of another man;
he cannot be permitted to practice such a deception, nor to use the means which contribute to that end.”).
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consumer inclination to sustain additional expenses in exchange for
assurances that the product being purchased emanates from a particular
source or producer. The consumer has a right to expect a consistent and
uniform level of quality when purchasing goods or services associated with
a specific trademark originating from a single source. When a producer uses
another’s trademark to deceive the consumer, he or she violates the rights of
the legitimate trademark holder. Trademark law displaces confusion between
two trademarks and so a future trademark that engenders a likelihood of
confusion with a registered trademark may not be registered.
Cyberspace is used to disseminate information, expand networks and
generate commercial opportunities.178 Cyberspace engenders trans-boundary
disputes over trademarks and other aspects of intellectual property. The
globalization of communications via the Internet has led to a system where
trademarks and trade names may be used as a method of communication, via
domain names. Thus, domain names may be both address and trademark.
B. Marks as Trademarks
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof” used in commerce to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.179 Trademarks, when registered at the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), merit protection against infringements, unfair
competition, dilution etc. Similarly, trade names are names used to identify
a person’s business or vocation. They cannot be protected as trademarks, but
are still entitled to protection against unfair competition. Certification marks
designate that particular goods have been certified by the owner of the mark
regarding origin, material, method of infrastructure, quality and accuracy.180
Certification marks, as protected by national and international IP law, have
become a de facto obstacle to market access for exporters from developing
and the least developed states that are not members of TRIPS.181
A descriptive mark is a word, name, or symbol used to indicate a brand
of merchandise or service describing the qualities or characteristics of the
178. The number of “hits” a domain name receives can be used in determining the value of the
domain name, because a potential domain name purchaser is more likely to pay more for a domain name
that receives many “hits” than one that receives very few.
179. Lanham Act 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006).
180. Mariela Maidana-Eletti, Market Access and Trademark Protection in the WTO Regime: The
Case of Certification Marks, RECHT UND GESUNDHEIT: JUNGE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT LUZERN 69, 82
(2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602000.
181. NEIL WILKOF & DANIEL BURKITT, TRADE MARK LICENSING, 176–78 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d
ed. 2005).
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merchandise or service sold under that mark. The Lanham Act allows
applicants to register marks that are “distinctive” of the applicant’s goods or
services in commerce, including descriptive marks that have “become
distinctive.”182
Descriptive marks do not distinguish the origin or source of a product
as well as a mark that is fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive because descriptive
terms retain their original descriptive meaning.183 Hence, descriptive terms
used as marks do not automatically or immediately signal a brand (unlike
inherently distinctive marks), because they also describe the attributes of the
product.
Generic marks, such as “Shredded Wheat” breakfast cereal, include the
common name for a class of products or services and are never considered
worthy of trademark protection.184 If the key connotation of the term in the
minds of the consuming public is the product, rather than the producer, the
mark cannot be protected under trademark law.185 Protecting exclusive rights
in generic terms would restrain free expression in the marketplace and
damage competition, and companies cannot have a monopoly on the use of
common words that consumers use to refer in general to a product.
Trademark law stifles the free flow of commercial information more
than necessary when it protects exclusive rights in inherently distinctive
marks and descriptive marks. Trademark laws harm speech when they grant
exclusive rights in marks that are not inherently distinctive. Trademark law
should persuade companies to use inherently distinctive marks as these
marks instantaneously tell a customer that the term refers to a brand name,
not a product attribute.186 It is necessary to protect the capability of
consumers to identify and distinguish among the products of a business and
its competitors; descriptive trademark laws do not directly advance this
interest and are more extensive than necessary.187 Distinctiveness is a
requirement to register a mark on the federal principal register, and for
protection of exclusive trademark rights. However, the term “distinctive” is

182. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1052(e)(1), 1052(f), 1053 (2006).
183. Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods Co. 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995), quoted in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 212–3 (2000) (“Consumers are therefore predisposed to regard those
symbols as indication of the producer.”).
184. Kellogg Co. v Nat’l Biscuit Co. 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (rejecting the plaintiff’s contention
that it was entitled to exclusive use of the generic term “shredded wheat”).
185. Id.
186. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park & Fly 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
187. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission 447 U.S. 557 (1980); S.F.
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).

10 ZEKOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE

4/22/16 1:28 PM

347

not defined anywhere in the Lanham Act.188 The distinctiveness of a mark is
judged either on the basis of its nature or character, or on the starting point
of whether it has been used to such an extent that it has come to be
established as signifying the origin of the applicant’s goods or services.189 To
this extent, only distinctive marks are eligible for trademark protection,
generic terms can never become valid marks, and descriptive terms are
protectable if they acquire distinctiveness.190
Existing descriptive trademark laws arguably restrict more speech than
required by protecting rights in marks that are not distinctive and used fairly
and in good faith by others. As a result, trademark law is broader than
necessary by granting and enforcing exclusive rights in descriptive marks,
along with protecting trademark rights in inherently distinctive marks.191 If
the mark owner stops using the mark and does not intend to again use the
mark, trademark rights for the mark will be extinguished and the mark will
be abandoned.192 If clients think the mark is the name of the product rather
than a source indicator, the mark has ceased to function as a trademark,
becoming the generic term for the product itself.193
Trademark use has been a requirement for the acquisition and
maintenance of trademark rights, and showing that the defendant used or is

188. Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.1051–1127 (2002).
189. Michael Handler, A Critical Assessment of Trade Mark Distinctiveness and Descriptiveness
under Australian Law, 28th Annual Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New Zealand
(IPSANZ)
Conference,
Queenstown,
New
Zealand,
Sept.
19–21,
2014,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509994; Modena Trading Pty Ltd v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC
110; Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd [2014] HCATrans 53
190. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2010) (use of
Lexus mark in domain names by independent Lexus brokers to identify the services they offered); Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–22 (3d Cir. 2005) (use of real estate
company marks by Internet real estate referral service on its website); New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (use by newspaper of pop music group’s
mark for telephone survey among readers).
191. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (noting that the majority correctly determined that “the regulations [at issue] fail
even the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”); United States v. Edge Broad. Co. 509 U.S. 418, 426
(1993) (“The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression”); City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 422
(1993)(“Speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other
constitutionally guaranteed expression”); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Comm. 483
U.S. 522, 535 (1987)(“Commercial speech “receives a limited form of First Amendment protection”).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
193. Nautilus Group, Inc., v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. 372 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(stating that “generic terms . . . are not [capable of receiving trademark protection]. Generic terms describe
a category of products, and therefore cannot signal any particular source: A trademark answers the buyer’s
questions ‘Who are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches for you?’ But the generic name of a
product answers the question ‘What are you?’”).
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using the plaintiff’s mark, or a mark similar to it, is required for bringing a
claim of trademark infringement. Trademarks are a psychological incident,
deriving their function and effectiveness from the human inclination to rely
on a likeable symbol for making purchasing choices.194
As mentioned earlier, a trademark is any “‘symbol’ or ‘device’ . . .
capable of carrying meaning” that serves as a commercial signature placed
upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.195 A right to the
mark in gross and the legal protection of the “psychological function of
symbols” are separated196 Trademarks convey property rights in gross.197
Any conduct in which trademark law applies has to engross the use of a
symbol in a way that consumers can perceive the symbol so that it can exert
its commercial pull on them.
Proper trademark usage requires use of the mark as directly associated
with the goods sold under the mark as possible with immediate customer
perception of the relationship of goods and mark, is indispensable for the
creation of trademark rights.198 Hence, there is a need for open and noticeable
use of the mark in close proximity to the goods sold under it, so as to permit
consumers to perceive the goods and mark together. Physical affixation of
the mark on the goods if possible is required.199 It is worth mentioning that
the development of digital goods and services makes the affixation of a mark
in electronic form important for those goods and services in order for
customers to perceive the mark and goods together. Trademark law permits
a high level of protection for arbitrary trademarks, for example, a common

194. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (viewing trademarks as “a
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing
mark or symbol—a commercial signature—upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold”).
195. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co. 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2001).
196. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. at 97; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge
Co. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
197. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Group, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999);
Promatek Indus., Ltd v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2003); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum
Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant used allegedly infringing mark as its corporate name,
in its advertising and marketing materials, and to identify itself to callers on the telephone); Green Prods
Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (defendant used
plaintiff’s trademark as domain name for defendant’s web site); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt (Cal.)
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (defendant used allegedly infringing
mark in a domain name for the defendant’s website).
198. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002).;
McDonald’s Corp. v. Burger King Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
199. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying
the likelihood of confusion test to ascertain whether the defendant’s use of its trademark violated
plaintiff’s trademark right).
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word or phrase that is used in an uncommon way, and descriptive trademarks
that have acquired secondary meaning with a relatively lower level of
protection.200
Trademarks express source and quality information to consumers
through the use of brand names, logos or symbols adorning goods and
services.201 A trademark signifies that goods bearing the mark come from the
same source and are of consistent level and quality. Companies utilize new
branding techniques that make use of “non-traditional marks” such as color,
sound and even scent to distinguish their products from competitors’
products and entice consumers. Businesses use these symbols not only as
source signifiers, but also as promises of reliability and quality. Consumers
neither know nor care about the true origin of the product, only that it is the
quality they seek. As mentioned earlier, a mark is a source-identifying
symbol, and customers depend on these marks to differentiate one brand of
a product from another.202
The functionality doctrine bars trademark protection for source
identifying product features that add to the functional performance of a
product. In patent and copyright law, functionality clearly assigning
intellectual property subject matter to the IP law designed to incentivize it.
In patent law, only functionally useful inventions can obtain utility patents
and the distinction between functional and ornamental defines the line
between utility patents and design patents. In copyright, the idea-expression
and merger doctrines direct functionally useful subject matter to the patent
system.203 The rationale of trademark law is not to incentivize innovation,
but rather to guard source-identifying symbols that consumers utilize to
access information concerning product quality.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) addressed non-traditional
trademark registration and established procedures tackling many of the
200. Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying
the test developed in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), and
noting that “Amazon” for an online bookstore is an example of an arbitrary trademark); see also
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that “[a]n ‘arbitrary’ mark has a significance recognized in everyday life, but the thing it normally
signifies is unrelated to the product or service to which the mark is attached, such as CAMEL cigarettes
or APPLE computers”) (internal quotations omitted); Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905
n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The law conceptually classifies trademarks along a spectrum of increasing
distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”)
201. Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (noting that trademarks are “valuable
business assets” and it is “the policy of the law to protect them as assets of a business”).
202. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995).
203. Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, UNIV. TEX. SCH. L., L. & ECON.
RESEARCH PAPER NO. E557, at 1, 2 (May 2015).

10 ZEKOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

350

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

4/22/16 1:28 PM

[Vol 15:313

concerns raised by non-traditional trademarks in the United States. The
European Union’s strict graphic representation requirement for nontraditional trademark registrations provides legal certainty and
accessibility.204 Two initiatives combine to create European Union trademark
law—the First Council Directive and the Community Trade Mark
Regulation.205 Graphic representation ensures that the scope and nature of
the mark are plainly defined and comprehensible so that searchers checking
the registry can readily ascertain what is registered. The ECJ requires graphic
representation by “means of images, lines or characters, so that [the mark]
can be precisely identified.”206 European Union trademark law acknowledges
that while consumers often recognize traditional marks, such as words and
logos as readily indicating source, this may not be the case with colors,
sounds and scents.
Harmonized EU trademark law absorbs the role traditionally vested in
national unfair competition laws by proposing broader protection of
goodwill and growing control over “referential” (nominative) use.207 There
is a need for broad trademark rights to also harmonize trademark law in the
EU, such as combining a general fair use clause with several more precise
provisions.208 The Parliament and the Council rejected the initial
Commission proposal, which sought to reduce trademark protection to the
traditional understanding of trademarks.209 Trademark protection does not
unnecessarily limit freedom of expression and competition, and the
recommendation explains that the interests of trademark proprietors and
consumers are not only at stake, but also those of competitors. The use of the
mark should only be held to infringe where it is obviously unfair.210 Because
204. Case C-447/02 P, KWS Saat AG v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-10119; Case C-283/01, Shield Mark
BV v. Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2003 E.C.R. I-14323; Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent und
Markenamt, 2001 E.C.R. I-11750.
205. First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate to the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, recitation 9, 1989 O.J. (L 40/1); Council Regulation (EC) No.
40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11/1).
206. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent und Markenamt, 2001 E.C.R. I-11750; Case
C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2003 E.C.R. I-14323; Case C-49/02, Heidelberger
Bauchemie GmbH 2004 E.C.R. I-6134.
207. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185.
208. Case C-236/08-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I02417.
209. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark, at 3, COM (2013) 161 final (Mar. 27,
2013).
210. G.B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing
Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 152 (2009) (“However, as the scope of
trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds of protection become more uncertain, we cannot
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marks indicate their commercial origin, and channel the flow of revenues
procured on the market back to their proper commercial source, they do not
interfere with competition on the production level. Therefore, competitors
are free to offer exactly the same product, but only if they use a different
mark indicating a different origin.211 Marks consisting of the shapes of goods
are not to be treated differently from other marks,212 because shapes are
subject to an absolute and enduring exclusion from protection in order to
safeguard competition interests.213
C. Trademarks as Domain Names
Managing domain names remains central for the functioning of
cyberspace. State-enacted law has been very inadequate in terms of
regulating domain names, even with intervention. Special private tribunals
or panels, such as the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDRP”), decide conflicts concerning domain names. Legal certainty and
predictability are difficult to accomplish with the UDRP, because of the lack
of precedent, and the multinational composition of the panels.
ICANN organizes and oversees the Internet’s underlying address book,
namely the Domain Name System (“DNS”). The DNS administers the DNS
root zone management, such as generic (“gTLD”) and country code TopLevel Domains (“ccTLD”).
The first step in materializing a corporate presence in cyberspace is to
choose a domain name that is thoroughly conceived in order to sufficiently
represent the company or organization using it. A domain name is equivalent
to a telephone directory or directory assistance for the Internet. If the
organization switches IP addresses, the same memorable or deducible
domain name can still be used by the organization. Dilution problems arise
when any non-trademark holders use domain names based on famous marks
for their own websites.214
The chosen domain name often conflates the company’s trademark. In
other words, if a company has a mark or trade name, the company should
rely exclusively on creative interpretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish limits. Trademark
law must more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values at stake in trademark
disputes.”).
211. Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke; Case T450/09, Simba Toys v. OHIM
(concerning trade mark protection for a three dimensional puzzle in the shape of Rubik’s cube).
212. Cases C-53/01–C-55/01, Linde, Winward and Rado v. DPMA, 2003 E.C.R. I-03161
(concerning the shapes of a fork-lift truck, a torchlight and a wristwatch).
213. Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee v. Huber and Attenberger, 1999 E.C.R.
I-2823.
214. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963).
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have a domain name that is the same as the mark or trade name enhancing
communication with the company’s customer base. The chosen name must
plainly identify the company, enabling the consumer to distinguish the
requisite nexus between the corporation and the Internet URL. A URL or
Internet site address will contain a trademark as the second level domain and
as a distinctive identifier of a company.
Except for functioning as locators/addresses, domain names function as
signs to pinpoint goods or services that are being offered on cyberspace. As
a result, such unauthorized commercial uses normally constitute trademark
infringement. Therefore, the overlap between trademark law and domain
names is very high.215
A domain name facilitates the identification of Internet hosting
services; entails the devolution of rights to a single, exclusive owner; and
conveys uninterrupted monopolies in cyberspace.216 Rules pertaining to
trademark registration do not extend to domain name registration, and due to
weak registration requirements, registrants have the power to create a
monopoly in generic terms such as “mail,” “toys” or “book.”217
Internet domain names increasingly require rigid protection and
enforcement.218 Courts clearly should continue to apply the likelihood of
confusion standard, the average consumer test, whenever confronted with
domain name disputes. If a company uses a domain name with the aim of
hijacking customers from another competitor, its conduct clearly violates the
Lanham Act.219
Domain name registration alone would not amount to using a trademark
pursuant to the Trademark Act.220 The name must be used as a source
indicator. Hence, the resemblance between two trademarks remains a
determining factor in the inquiry, because where two marks are wholly
dissimilar, there is no likelihood of confusion. Comparable considerations
also govern scenarios where users of contentious trademarks operate in

215. Chih-Hong (Henry) Tsai, The Trademark/Domain Name Protection War: A Comparative Study
of the U.S., UDRP and Taiwanese Law, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 350 (2013).
216. Thomas v. Network Solutions Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 503–04 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
217. Shade’s Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999) (expounding that for
“Internet businesses who make the mistake of choosing a domain name deemed descriptive or generic,
there seems to be little that they can do to gain trademark protection for their domain name”).
218. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that
“disputes over domain names have become increasingly common with the expanding commercial use of
the Internet”).
219. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1439 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), aff ‘d 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998) (confronting an anti-abortion
website).
220. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999).
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geographically different markets. There is a need to examine whether the
products or services offered are inextricably intertwined, along with the
“competitive proximity” between the companies and products at hand.
Moreover, courts examine whether the same customer is targeted and
whether cyberspace is used as a vehicle for marketing and advertisement. In
Brookfield, both marks relied on a common channel to disseminate
information.
Are domain names more like addresses, and geographic designators,
rather than trademarks? Because marks that are primarily geographic in
nature are not entitled to trademark protection, neither would be domain
names if they were more like street addresses than trademarks. Federal
trademark law in the United States and Greece allow concurrent use of the
same mark by others, as long as such use is not likely to cause confusion or
to cause mistake or to deceive. Another problem that arises is that names that
could not be registered or protected as trademarks nonetheless receive a
perpetual monopoly as domain names. Furthermore, trademarks that consist
of “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” or that are primarily
geographically descriptive or primarily surnames are not capable of being
registered. Therefore, marks must be distinctive in order to be registered.
Marks that consist of coined words or arbitrary uses of language that are
arbitrary or fanciful are considered to be inherently distinctive, and so marks
that require mental imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of goods are suggestive and also inherently
distinctive. On the other hand, marks that are merely descriptive or generic
are not capable of becoming trademarks. Although descriptive terms can
attain secondary meaning through use and advertising, and so become
distinctive and registration-worthy, generic terms, such as the common
descriptive term for the genus of a product or service, are never distinctive
and cannot get protection as trademarks. The purpose of the distinctiveness
requirement is to keep common words and phrases in the public domain, in
order to ensure a competitive marketplace. Trademark laws now protect
descriptive terms that have become distinctive through the secondary
meaning principle.221
The merger of trademark law with Internet domain names indicates that
borrowing concepts in law is the basic instrument of developing the law. The
distinctive aspects of trademark use in cyberspace have led companies to

221. Lisa P. Ramsey & Jens Schovsbo, Mechanisms for Limiting Trade Mark Rights to Further
Competition and Free Speech, 44 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L., 671 (2013) (such as “FishFri”).
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adopt strategies to get the most value from their trademarks. The most
common method of locating an unknown domain name is merely to type in
the company name or logo with the suffix “.com.” Companies prefer their
domain name to be comprised of the company or brand trademark, and the
suffix “.com.”222 Trademarks are used in e-commerce in a variety of ways.
A trademark could be used as part of the domain name of a website, or on
the face of a web page and in the metatags of a web page.
Cyberpiracy and cybersquatting are the two activities threatening
companies by utilizing their trademarks as domain names. Cyberpirates
acquire domain names in order to switch customers from a trademark
owner’s site to their own, allowing them to profit off the mark’s goodwill
and benefit by either confusing customers as to the source of the goods or
services sold, or by generating advertising revenue from the additional
customers. Revenue on the web is still driven mainly by advertising, and
advertising is based on traffic hits to the site, rather than sales from the site.
Cyberpirates seek to attract this traffic by registering domains names that are
identical or similar to popular trademarks. A cybersquatter is a person who
knowingly reserves a trademark as a domain name simply to sell it for a
profit. Companies often prefer to pay off cybersquatters rather than pursue
lawsuits against them.223
Predominantly with regard to the phenomenon of cybersquatting,
traditional trademark law was clearly unable to cope with the new
challenges.224 Courts relied on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(“FTDA”) as the tool of choice in combating cybersquatters. However, the
FTDA only protects famous marks, and thus does not provide any protection
to “ordinary” trademark owners.225 The FTDA requires trademark use by the
defendant of the allegedly infringing term, which is not met where a
cybersquatter simply and passively holds a domain name without connecting
it to a website. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(“ACPA”) enables trademark owners to recover domain names
incorporating terms identical to, or similar to, the plaintiffs’ marks from

222. Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000).
223. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 304 (D.N.J. 1998).
224. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1228–29 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision Int’l, L.P.
v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1998).
225. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that for famous
trademarks, the federal trademark dilution law extends protection against subsequent uses that blur or
tarnish the distinctiveness of the famous trademark, even absent a likelihood of confusion).
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parties who have registered such domain names in bad faith.226 Internet
domain name disputes focus on protecting holders of trademarks from badfaith registrations and uses of domain names that correspond to relevant
trademark interests.
D. Trademarks and Territoriality
Trademark law is territorial since the initial IP conventions of the late
nineteenth century, the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, were given national treatment.227
A signatory state was obliged to offer protection to nationals of other
signatory states that matched the protection afforded its own nationals. Law
is contextual, and geography is a central part of context. Trademark rights
have been defined territorially. Trademark rights that have been defined
territorially flowed logically from the intrinsic purpose of trademark law.
Whether viewed as an instrument to safeguard producer goodwill, or to
protect consumers against confusion, the purpose of trademark law was
served by recognizing rights in the local producer.228
Territoriality reflects efforts to protect goodwill to the extent of its
geographic reach. On the other hand, global markets and digital
communication have encouraged a need for more effective international
enforcement of rights and the motivation of cross-border trade. Trademarks
function as badges of origin by designating the source of goods or services
to the consumer. As a result, trademark rights preclude others from taking
advantage of the reputation associated with a trademark and diverting trade
away from the trademark owner’s selling.229
According to article 6 of the EU Directive, the scope of the territorial
right is limited in order to preserve its essential function of a trademark.230

226. Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 523 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 56
Fed. Appx. 599, 600 (4th Cir. 2003).
227. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 31; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
828 U.N.T.S. 305.
228. Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d
732, 733 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of the junior user nationally to exclude the senior user
from the local area in which the junior user was the first to use).
229. Case T-79/00, Rewe-Zentral v. OHIM (LITE), 2002 E.C.R. II-717; Case T-128/01, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-711; First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988
to Approximate to the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 5(1)–(2), 1989 O.J. (L
40/1).
230. Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed 2002 E.C.R. I-10291; Case T130/01, Sykes Enterprises Inc. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-5187.
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The boundaries of trademark law have been delineated in part by reference
to physical geography. However, in cyberspace, apparent spatial boundaries
are collapsed because, as a technological matter, there can be only one
diavlos.com domain name, and it can only point to one firm.231 The court in
Panavision Int’l v Toeppen expanded the geographical reach of trademark
law with regard to domain names.232 As a result, applying trademark law to
domain names has resulted in trademark law becoming unmoored to physical
geography, and is more likely to operate extra-territorially. Parties claiming
ownership in a mark could sue in a different country, and due to differences
in substantive law, each party could win. As a result, enforcement becomes
a problem as trademark law grows in scope in cyberspace.233 The ACPA
provides in rem jurisdiction over the domain name wherever that name is
registered by creating assertions of jurisdiction. The question is whether they
comport with Constitutional Due Process guarantees.234 Congress cannot
avoid the constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice
purely by calling an action in rem, and by limiting recovery to the res itself.235
As first described in Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics
Corp., the factors taken into consideration in determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists between two marks are: the strength of the
mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the
products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual
231. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918) (“[W]here two parties
independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly
remote from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant.”).
232. Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Panavision Int’l v.
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)); Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(2012); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 106-479 § 3002 (1999) (providing an explicit Federal remedy to combat so-called “cybersquatting”).
233. Mecklermedia Corp. v. DC Congress GmbH [1998] 1 All E.R. 148, 160 (reaching a different
conclusion on ownership of a mark from the one reached in other countries).
234. Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D. Mass.
2001) (finding that in rem provisions of the ACPA violate due process when the domain name registration
paper is subsequently transferred to a district other than the district where the registrar is located);
Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865–66 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that
the registration of a domain name, without more, cannot be sufficient minimum contacts for the purposes
of in personam jurisdiction); America Online, Inc. v. Chih-Hsien Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859–60
(E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that filing an online domain name registration agreement with Network
Solutions is not sufficient contact with Virginia to justify in personam jurisdiction); Caesars World, Inc.
v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding sufficient contacts for purposes
of in rem jurisdiction); Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 n.5 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (finding that registration is sufficient minimum contact for in personam jurisdiction).
235. Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(“[U]nder Shaffer, there must be minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem
proceedings where the underlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located in the
forum state.”).
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confusion, the reciprocal of the defendant’s good faith in adopting its own
mark, the quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the
buyers are.236 Protecting famous trademarks constitutes a vital purpose in IP
law, stemming from the broader international thrust purporting to enshrine
and protect well-known marks.237 Safeguarding well-known marks is
important, along with concurrently generating disincentives for
manufacturers to intrude upon famous marks. Well-known marks will often
become household brand names and may be sold, licensed, or assigned by
legitimate owners of the mark for considerable financial gain. To that extent,
domain names have become the priceless intangible real estate of
cyberspace. A trademark has to be used for selling a product or service. The
present legal framework tolerates comparative advertising by allowing for a
comparison of products when the objective is to inform the end-user of the
differences between similar products.238
Traditionally, trademark law is designed for minimizing consumer
search costs, and the basic doctrinal structure of attenuated, perception-based
rights must be preserved. Traditional trademark law—in contrast to
trademark dilution law—possesses “a built-in First Amendment compass,”
making it “wholly consistent with the theory of the First Amendment, which
does not protect commercial fraud.”239 Distinctiveness and confusion are the
two terms in which courts have developed their views regarding the
protection and use of trademarks. The importance of consumer protection
cannot be over-emphasized, and the average consumer standard should
remain the central point of the inquiry, even during under domain name
litigation.

236. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir. 1962); see also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,
939–40 (6th Cir. 2003).
237. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305.
238. Trade-marks Act R.S.C., ch. T-13, 11.16(2)–(3) (1985).
239. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters. v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a search engine could be
liable for initial confusion created by banner advertisement appearing on search results page); Google
Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing
infringement case to go forward against the search engine for selling advertisements on website keyed to
trademarked terms).
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IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
A. Data and Methodology
All the national laws in force by the end of 2012 of the seventy-nine
investigated jurisdictions have been examined and used in the ranking of the
various factors when constructing ZEKIPR6 index.240 Therefore, all future
changes to intellectual property laws and their enforcement will continue to
alter our indices. Therefore, the IPRs’ index will be continuously updated.
Furthermore, sub-indices for the protection of the individual intellectual
property rights, such as patents, copyright and trademarks can be obtained
by the national laws of the investigated countries by taking only the national
law plus the enforcement legal rating into account. The following indices are
used:
ZEKIPR6= Membership in International Treaties + INDEX OF
PATENT RIGHTS + INDEX OF COPYRIGHT+ INDEX OF
TRADE-MARK RIGHTS + Enforcement legal rating (Legal
Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic level)
Zekcopy6= INDEX OF COPYRIGHT+ Enforcement legal rating (Legal
Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic level)
Zekmark6= INDEX OF TRADE-MARK RIGHTS + Enforcement legal
rating (Legal Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic
level)
Enforcement legal rating (Legal Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal
Education+ Economic level) is made according to this author’s evaluation.
The following graphs illustrate the prices of zekmark6 & zekcopy6:

240. GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, IPRS PROTECTION AND THEIR IMPACT UPON FDI, GDP GROWTH AND
TRADE (2013).
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where, for the ith case, Yi is the response variable,
are p
regressors, and
is a mean zero error term. The quantities
are unknown
coefficients, whose values are determined by least squares.
In detail, the following are the econometric models that are used in our
investigation to find the impact of IPRs and GCI upon attracting FDI inflows:
FDIit= b0 + b1 Zekcopy6it + b2 GDPit+ b3 Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit

(1)

FDIit= b0 + b1 GCIit + b2 GDPit+ b3Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit

(2)

FDIit= b0 + b1 Zekmark6it + b2 GDPit+ b3 Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit

(3)

The first thing to notice is the two subscripts: one denotes the ith individual
country, and the second, t, denotes the tth time period. The analysis is focused on
FDI inflows. FDI inflows FDIin2012-=US Dollars at current prices and current
exchange rates in millions, 2012 UNCTADstat, b0 is the intercept, and (GDP GR
2012 = GDP growth (annual %) 2012 World Bank, INF2012= Inflation, consumer
prices (annual %), 2012 World Bank, TRADE2012= Trade (% of GDP), 2012 World
Bank, GCI. The Global Competitiveness Index in 2011–12 (GCI) are the
explanatory variables.

B. Empirical Results
We start with correlating the variables utilized in our econometric models in
order to avoid multicollinearity:
. corr zekcopy6 zekmark6 gdp2012 trade2012 gdpgr2012 inf2012 gci12
(obs=55)
zekcopy6 zekmark6
zekcopy6
zekmark6
gdp2012
trade2012
gdpgr2012
inf2012
gci12

1.0000
0.9843
0.4423
0.2377
-0.4992
-0.4506
0.8216

1.0000
0.4291
0.2501
-0.5126
-0.4927
0.8368

gdp2012 tra~2012 gdpgr2~2

inf2012

gci12

1.0000
-0.2145
-0.2538
-0.1406
0.4169

1.0000
-0.5375

1.0000

1.0000
-0.0850
-0.2268
0.4371

1.0000
0.2879
-0.2474

The analysis of the data utilizing our econometric models gives the following
results:

1. FDI Inflows OLS Model 1/ Model 3 Beta Coefficients
We start our investigation with Model 1 by using OLS standardized
coefficients, or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 5.70***, 5.77***, 6.50***)
show the significance of zekcopy6 in 2012 for the five- and ten-years reference for
foreign direct investment, net inflows U.S. Dollars at current prices and current
exchange rates in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat (Table 1). It is worth
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mentioning here that the zekcopy6 beta regarding FDI inflows are 0.6664939,
0.6750876 and 0.7339297, respectively.
We continue our investigation with Model 3, by using OLS standardized
coefficients or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 5.82***, 6.12***, 6.66***) show
the significance of zekmark6 in 2012 for the five- and ten-years reference for foreign
direct investment, net inflows U.S. Dollars at current prices and current exchange
rates in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat (Table 1). Here the zekmark6 beta
regarding FDI inflows are 0.6839728, 0.7247498 and 0.7592528, respectively.
Table 1: FDI Inflows OLS Model 1/ Model 3 Beta Coefficients
Variables

zekcopy6
gdpgr2012
trade2012
inf2012

(1)
logfdiin201
2

(2)
logfdiin5
y

(3)
logfdiin10
y

5.70***
(1.231)
0.08
(0.063)
0.00
(0.003)
0.01
(0.054)

5.77***
(1.140)

6.50***
(0.982)

trade5y
inf5y

(5)
logfdiin5
y

0.20**
-0.062
0
-0.003
-0.01
-0.047
0.14
(0.071)
-0.00
(0.002)
-0.00
(0.000)

gdpgr10y
trade10y
inf10y
zekmark6
-0.45
(2.023)

(6)
logfdiin10
y

0.08
(0.063)
0.00
(0.003)
0.03
(0.055)
0.18**
-0.061
-0.00
(0.003)
-0.02
(0.047)

gdpgr5y

Constant

(4)
logfdiin201
2

-0.47
(1.981)

-1.77
(1.685)

5.82***
(1.271)
-0.67
(2.093)

6.12***
(1.167)
-1.08
(2.028)

0.16*
(0.072)
-0.00
(0.002)
-0.00
(0.000)
6.66***
(0.986)
-2.04
(1.691)

Observations

52

76

79

52

76

79

R-squared
Adj. Rsquared

0.35

0.36

0.45

0.35

0.37

0.45

0.30

0.32

0.42

0.29

0.33

0.42

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
The following avplots (graphs an added-variable plot, a.k.a. partial regression
plot) illustrate the econometric outcomes:
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2. FDI inflows OLS Model 2 beta coefficients
We carry on our investigation with model 2 using OLS standardized
coefficients or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 2.06***, 1.82***, 1.87***) show
the significance of gci in 2012. The five and ten years reference for Foreign direct
investment, net inflows of U.S. Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates
in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat are also measured. It is worth
mentioning here that the gci betas for FDI inflows are 0.7735433, 0.721484 and
0.723533 respectively.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Copyright laws must expand as technology develops, in order to have an
adequate balance between private rights and public interests. One of the most
challenged issues in the field of intellectual property law is the level to which legally
created rights may be restraining, rather than encouraging, scientific research.
Although IP rights are intended to promote scientific progress, over proliferation or
distortion of an optimal arrangement of rights generates bottlenecks that hamper the
flow of research.
The above analysis of copyright and trademark law allows us to understand IP
rights while preparing our own IP rights indices.241 Moreover, the constant
development of the legal regulation and enforcement of IP rights, results in a nonstop
alteration of an index regarding copyright and trademark protection. The brief
econometric analysis further shows the significance of zekcopy6 and zekmark6, and
the competitiveness in attracting FDI inflows. Finally, the analysis of the legal
background of copyright and trademark law shows a continuous development of the
legal regulation and enforcement of IP rights. Therefore, there is a need for
continuous alteration of an index (zekcopy6- zekmark6) regarding the protection of
copyrights, trademarks and IP rights.
Copyright law must advance the creation, dissemination, and preservation of
works that are valuable to society, expressed not only by traditional means but also
by electronic means. Developing digital goods and services makes the introduction
of electronic trademarks necessary. The current legal environment does not tender
sufficient protection in the changing technological environment, but there is a need
to support technological advancement while protecting users’ data and interests.
Presently, technology is changing in a faster rhythm than the law, and this failure
translates into IPRs regulation. In the cyberspace and globalization era, copyright
regulation is not effective in complying with the needs of creators and society. As a
result, creators will have no motivation to create. The development of e-trademarks
demands an effective electronic international trademarks regulation. Of course, to
some extent, conventional trademarks laws are applicable to e-trademarks as well.
The territoriality of trademarks would transform into cyber-territoriality for cybertrademarks affixed to cyber-goods and services. Therefore, a system of electronic IP
rights is necessary to best protect the interests of creators and businesses in the digital
economy.
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